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CHAPTER 13 
State and Local Taxation 
GEORGE T. SHAW 
A. INCOME TAX: COURT DECISIONS 
. . 
§13.I. Personalfu~ome' tax: Income from foreign real estate 
trusts. In 1963, the taxpayer in State Tax Commn. v. Fine,la Mas-
sachusetts resident, received distributions from the Mesabi Trust, 
a Minnesota real estate .trust with transferable shares, the primary 
asset of which was land in Minnesota. This land was mined for iron 
ore and other minerals by a lessee who paid royalties to the trust for 
the privilege of removing the minerals. The trust distributed all its net 
income, consisting solely of the royalties, to the holders of beneficial 
interests in the trust. 
Under G.L., c. 62, §l, a Massachusetts resident is not taxed on 
dividends received from a trust with transferable shares which owns 
exclusively real estate or which is engaged principally in the owner-
ship, management, and operation of real estate. However, this ex-
emption is conditioned on the trust's filing an agreement with the 
Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation to pay a 6 percent tax 
on its income, to the extent that the income would be taxable under 
Section I if received by a Massachusetts resident. 
The Mesabi Trust had not filed this agreement with the commis-
sioner and had not paid a Massachusetts tax on its income. The tax-
payer was granted an abatement by the Appellate Tax Board on the 
tax paid by her by reason of the dividends from the Mesabi Trust 
received in 1963. The Court affirmed the decision of the Appellate 
Tax Board in an interesting but sometimes difficult to follow opin-
ion by Justice Cutter. 
The Fine decision cannot be understood without looking first at 
two earlier decisions of the Court. In State Tax Commn. v. Colbert,2 
the taxpayer received income with respect to transferable shares he 
owned in a Massachusetts trust which owned Massachusetts real estate. 
The trust had neither filed an agreement with the commissioner nor 
paid a tax on its trust income. Accordingly, Chapter 62, Section I 
would seem to have required that the taxpayer be taxed on the div-
idend distribution. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the tax-
payer, as a beneficial owner of the trust, held an equitable interest 
in the trust's real estate, from which the income (gains from the sale 
GEORGE T. SHAW is associated with the firm of Hemenway amll Barnes, Boston. 
§IU. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 827, 247 N.E.2d 701. 
2 M4 Mass. 494, 183 N.E.2d 277 (1962). 
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of trust real estate) was derived. A then operative statute exempted 
from the income tax "income derived·. . . from real estate,"3 and the 
Court held that the taxpayer's income in question was "derived ... 
from real estate" and was exempt. The income from real estate thus 
was allowed to pass through the trust to the taxpayer without a change 
of identity from real estate income to dividend income.' That the 
income reached the taxpayer as a dividend for other purposes was 
not controlling for Massachusetts tax purposes: the important char-
acterization was that the income was derived from real estate. By 
this characterization the Court avoided imposing a tax which seemed 
to be-required in view of the failure of the trust to file the agreement, 
stating that "[t]axation of shareholders' income derived from real 
estate trusts we think ought not to depend on whether the trustees 
have filed the agreement [with the Commissioner]."11 
In State Tax Commn. v. Wheatland,6 decided less than four months 
prior to Colbert, the Court placed great weight on the nature of the 
income. There, the taxpayer, a co-owner of Maine forest land, re-
ceived the net proceeds of timber severance royalties paid by loggers 
cutting timber from the Maine real estate. The commissioner sought 
to tax this income as business income. The Court referred to its ear-
lier decisions holding that the income tax is a property tax on the 
underlying property and then said: 
... The substance of this tax, however, is upon payments for 
the privilege of severing from the land a substantial part of its 
value. This is the predominant aspect of the payments. They are 
analogous to rent payments. If a tax upon rents is a property 
tax on the real estate from which the rents are derived, the tax 
under consideration seems at least equally a tax upon the land.'f 
If the Court had allowed the tax to be imposed, as interpreted by 
its own decisions, it would have been allowing Massachusetts to im-
pose a "property tax" on Maine real estate, Fearing that such a re-
sult would be impermissible under the Federal Constitution, the 
Court construed the business income statute narrowly as not taxing 
the timber severance royalties . 
. As can be seen from the foregoing ,discussion of Colbert and Wheat-
land, Fine presents an interesting combination of the significant fac-
tors of the earlier cases. Like Colbert,Fine involves distributions of 
income from a real estate trust with transferable shares, and like 
Wheatland, it involves payments for the removal of natural resources 
3 G.L., c. 62, §22, as appearing in Acts of 1959, c. 486, §2. A more narrow exemp-
tion for rental income now appears in G.L., c. 62, §8(1). 
4 Page, Massachusetts Real Estate Syndication: Tax /lnd Other Pitfalls, 45 B.U.L. 
Rev. 491, 509 n.70 (1965). 
II State Tax Commn. v. Colbert, !J44 Mass. at 497, 18, N.E.2d at 279,. 
6 M5 Mass. 650, 180 N.E.2d MO (1962). 
'f!d. at 655, 180 N.E.2d at 542. 
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from out of state realty. As might be expected, the FinE~ decision fol-
lows the rationale of the other cases. 
The Court first noted that historically the Massachusetts income 
tax has always been considered a property tax. It then used the con-
duit theory of Colbert to decide that Mrs. Fine had received income 
of the same nature as the trust, notwithstanding its distribution to 
her in the form of a dividend. The real estate income exemption 
statute applicable in Colbert had been amended prior to the year 
in question in Fine. Formerly it had been sufficient if the income 
was derived from real estate, but the statute applicable at the time 
of Fine exempted only "income from rentals of real estate."8 Given 
the conduit theory, gains from sales of trust real estate in Colbert 
clearly constituted income derived from real estate, but the mining 
royalties in Fine could be "income from rentals of real estate" only 
by equating them with the timber severance royalties of Wheatland 
and further by construing Wheatland as holding, not that the timber 
severance royalties were analogous to rents (as the Wheatland opin-
ion said they were),9 but that they were rents. The Court in Fine 
accepted both challenges and held that the mining royalties received 
by the Mesabi Trust constituted rental income. 
One factor prevented the Court from concluding, without further 
discussion, that the income received by Mrs. Fine was not taxable 
simply on the authority of Colbert and Wheatland. Subsequent to 
Colbert, Chapter 62, Section 1 (e), was amended to read as follows, 
the amendment adding the italicized language: 
Any such dividend issued by partnerships, associations, or trusts, 
the beneficial interest in which is represented by transferable 
shares, regardless of ,their source and whether taxable or not, 
shall be taxable under this section if the said partnership, asso-
ciation or trust fails to, file an agreement with the commissioner 
as hereinbefore provided. [Emphasis added.]lO 
The legislative history of the amendmentll reveals that the State Tax 
Commission recommended that the legislature clarify its intent with 
respect to the decision in Colbert. The amendatory language which 
the commission recommended and which was enacted "sets out in 
adequate language that which the Department of Corporations and 
Taxation has always felt was the original basis for the initial passage 
of the law."12 
It is not clear from this history whether the amendment was in-
tended to deal with the particular facts of Colbert (a Massachusetts 
trust owning Massachusetts land making income distributions to a 
8 See note II supra. 
9 lI4l1 Mass. at 65l1, ISO N.E.2d at 342. 
10 G.L., c. 62, §l(e), as amended by Acts of 19611. c. 496. 
1119611 H. Doc. No. 101, at 2-lI, quoted in Fine, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 8112 n.l0, 
247 N.E.2d at 705·706 n.10. 
12 Ibid. 
3
Shaw: Chapter 13: State and Local Taxation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1969
§18.1 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 348 
Massachusetts resident) or whether it was intended to apply equally 
to all real estate trusts with transferable shares, whether owning land 
within or without the Commonwealth. The latter interpretation, if 
accepted by the Court, would have forced the Court in Fine to face 
the constitutional issue it evaded in Wheatland: could the Massachu-
setts income tax, previously construed by the Court as a property 
tax on the property producing the income, be applied to income 
from foreign real estate? 
In addition to the ambiguity of the legislative history, there is 
ambiguity in the language of the amendment itself. First, does "their" 
refer to "any such dividend," to "trusts" or to "shares"? Application 
of the rules of grammar would eliminate "dividend" as an antecedent, 
but, in the context of the statute, neither "trusts" nor "shares" have a 
source and neither is "taxable." It is submitted that the only reasonable 
interpretation is to read the amended statute "any such dividend ... 
regardless of [its] source and whether taxable or not." The second 
ambiguity relates to "source." Is "source" used in a geographical sense 
(Massachusetts or foreign trust owning Massachusetts or foreign land), 
or is it used with reference to the type of income from which the 
dividend is paid (rental income, farming income, timber severance 
royalties)? While the former interpretation is the more reasonable, in 
Colbert there was no issue raised as to the geographical source of the 
dividend, and it seems strange that the word "source" would be used 
if the amendment were intended solely to apply to a factual situation 
like Colbert. 
The Court in Fine, without noting the above ambiguities, con-
cluded that the amendment was intended to deal only with facts like 
those presented in the Colbert decision. As noted earlier, a contrary 
conclusion would have made the Court decide a constitutional issue, 
with which it was clearly unwilling to wrestle, whether the Massachu-
setts income tax, which the Court has always viewed as a form of 
property tax, could constitutionally tax gains derived from sister-state 
property. The merits of this constitutional issue have been examined 
e1sewhere,18 and it is sufficient to note here with respect to that issue 
that it is likely that the United States Supreme Court would not feel 
bound by the Supreme Judicial Court's characterization of the Massa-
chusetts income tax as a property tax and would conclude indepen-
dently that the Massachusetts income tax is more akin to what is 
commonly thought of as an income tax than to a true property tax. 
Nevertheless, the court in Fine again evaded this issue by holding that 
the 1965 amendment did not show a legislative intent to extend appli-
cation of the Massachusetts tax to the Fine situation. 
It is submitted that the Court reached the wrong result with respect 
to the interpretation of the 1965 amendment. It must be remembered 
that the Wheatland decision, raising the constitutional issue in a direct 
ownership context, was handed down only a few months prior to 
18 See 1962 Ann. Surv. Ma.. Law §17.17. 
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Colbert. Surely the State Tax Commission could easily foresee that 
issue arising in the context of a ColberMype trust ownin~; foteign real 
estate. It does not do violence to either the legislative history of. the 
1963 amendment or its language to construe it as a legislative decision 
to extend the income tax to its constitutional limits. If, a,s it is herein 
suggested, the legislature was pushing theCour~ into making the 
decision on the constitutional issue, it failed, and a new statute, 
specifically made applicable to foreign trusts and foreign real estate, 
can be expected. 
§13.2. Trust income: Exemption for accumulations forn()nres-
idents. Massachusetts exempts, from the· income' tax imposed by 
Chapter 62 of the General Laws certain' types of income payable to or 
accumulated for nonresidents of the Commonwealth.1 That exemption 
does not apply, however, when the income is ,"accumulated for unborn 
or unascertained persons or persons with uncertain interests .• '. :'2 
An uncertain interest includes "any future interest other than a 
remainder presently vested in a person ... in being not subject to be 
divested by the happening of any contingency expressly mentioned in 
the instrument creating the trust."8 
In State Tax Commn. 'tJ. New England Merchants Nau:onal Bank of 
Boston,' the trustee accumulated capital gains for a. nonresident 
beneficiary of a Massachusetts testamentary trust. The trust instrument 
directed the trustee to pay to the beneficiary on request all or any part 
of the principal and ~ccumulated income £ree and discharged of all 
trusts. The State Tax Commission appealed a decision of the Appellate 
Tax Board granting an abatement to the trustee with respect to the 
income taxes on the accumulated capital gains. The Court held that 
the nonresident beneficiary had a present rather than a future interest 
in the accumula~ed income of the trust and that therefore the exemp-
tion limitations applying to future interests were not pertinent. 
In earlier cases,1I the Court relied on a theory of constructive receipt 
to tax Massachusetts taxpayers on income received by nonresident 
trustees of trusts created by ,the taxpayers. In those cases, the governing 
trust instrument authorized the setdors to receive income 'upon 
demand and, with the consent, of anothe:t trustee -' a nonadverse 
party - to amend or revoke the trust. In view of the powers. held by 
the settlors to obtain principal and interest on demand, the' Court in 
each case held that the taxpayer "received" the trust income for pur-
poses,of the Massachusetts taxing statute, although the income was not 
actu~ly distributed to' them. 
The'principle of these decisions was relied upon by the Court in the 
present case. It is not a large step to move from a holding that a tax-
§l!I.2. 1 G.L., .:. 62. §8(d). 
2 G.L., c. ,62, §10\ ' 
8 Ibid. ' 
'1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 855. 245 N.E.2d 448. 
15 Dewey v. State Tax Commn •• M6 Mus. 45, 190 N.E.2d 205 (l968); State Tax 
Commn. v. Pitts, MO Mus. 575. 165 N.E.2d 586 (1960). , ", , 
5
Shaw: Chapter 13: State and Local Taxation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1969
§13.S STATE AND LOCAL T.\XATION S45 
payer is deemed to receive income which is available to him upon 
demand to a holding that a person to whom income is distributable 
upon demand has a present, not a future, iriterest in the income for 
purposes of the limitation on the exemption in question. There should 
be no difference because this legal principle results in the imposition 
of a taX in one case and the allowance of an exemption in another. 
§UI.8. Corporate excise tax: Deduction for nonpatronage dividends 
paid by farmers' cooperatives. ' In Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. 
State Tax Commn.,l the Court was called upon to construe the defini-
tion of net income appearing in G.L., c. 68, §80, cl. 5, in the context 
of a deduction against gross income claimed for nonpatronage div-
idends oli capital stock paid during the taxable years 1960-1962 by 
Ocean Spray, a Delaware farmers' cooperative with a usual place of 
buSiness in Massachusetts. For purposes of the Massachusetts excise tax 
on foreign corporations,B Ocean Spray was classified as a foreign manu-
facturing corporation.8 
The then operative language of Section 80, Clause 5 defined "net 
income" as gross income from all sources, "less the deductions, ... other 
than dividends, allowable ... " by the Internal Revenue Code for that 
year. The Court was initially assisted by the decision in Broadway 
National Bank of Chelsea v.' Commissioner of Corporations and Taxa-
tion' which, more than 20 years earlier, had held, in construing nearly 
identical ,statutory··language relating to the taxation of banks, that 
"other than dividends" meant "other than dividends received." Given 
the decision in Broadway National Bank and the apparent stipulation 
in Ocean Spray that the dividends paid during the years in question 
were deductible for federal tax purposes, it would have been difficult 
for the Court to conclude that Ocean Spray was not ,entitled to the 
claimed deduction. The Court, as might have been expected, held for 
the taxpayer and 'reversed the decision of the Appellate Tax Board 
which had d.enied the deduction. The Court clearly felt that it was 
bound by the "plain meaning of [Section 80, Clause 5's] language."11 
As a result of the decision, the taxpayer owed no taxes for the years 
in question since the nonpatronage dividends paid exceeded its gross 
income allocable to its Massachusetts business. It might have been 
this mctor whiCh led the State Tax Commission to make a curious argu-
ment before the Court. General Laws, c. 157, §18, exempts from taxa-
tion under Chapter 68 certain agricultural and horticultural corpora-
tions organized without capital stock pursuant to Section 10 of Chapter 
157~ The commission appeared to be contending that, since the General 
Court had seen fit to exempt from taxation under Chapter 68 only 
those cooperative organizations without capital stock, all other coopera-
§l!U. 11969 Mass.Mv. Sh. 555, 246 N.E.2d 654. 
2 G~., c. 65, §§39-45; 
8 G~., c. 65, §42B. 
'521 Mass. 25, 71 N.E.2d 607 (1947). 
15 Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. State Tu Commn., 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
556, 246 N.E.2d at 656. 
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tives must pay a tax. What is curious about this argument is that Ocean 
Spray was not contending that it was exempt from excisc~ taxation; it 
was simply claiming a deduction which, if allowed, would have the 
effect of offsetting its Massachusetts gross income, leaving no tax due 
to the Commonwealth. Ocean Spray did have capital stock and thus 
was a wholly different type of organization from that described in 
Section 18 of Chapter 157. The legislature was surely aware of coopera-
tives'with capital stock such as Ocean Spray, because Sections 3-9 of 
Chapter 157 make specific provision for their organization. When 
viewed in the context of the complete statutory schemt! in Chapter 
157, the limited exemption in Section 18 is narrow indeed. There is 
no similar exemption from Chapter 63 taxation for capital stock 
cooperatives such as Ocean Spray, and the defintion of a foreign manu-
facturing corporation under Chapter 63, Section 42B is broadly worded. 
That Ocean Spray was subject to tax pursuant to Chapter 63 seems 
clear. 
Clause 5 of G.L., c. 63, §30, was amended8 subsequent to the 
years in controversy in this case but prior to the present decision. The 
present language would not change the result of the case. A 1966 
amendment7 reworded Clause 5 to provide specifically that deductions 
shall not be allowed for dividends received. Thus, tht~ decision in 
Broadway National Bank was given statutory support. While not 
mentioned by the Court in the present case, the 1966 amendment must 
have provided further support for the Court's decision to follow the 
earlier case. 
B. INCOME TAX: LEGISLATION 
§13.4. Federal income tax deduction. The deduction of federal 
income taxes attributable to business income for purposes of computing 
Massachusetts business income has been eliminated.1 Because this 
change was applicable to taxable years commencing after December 31, 
1968, taxpayers were required to adjust their withholding and esti-
mated tax payments accordingly after the July 18, 1969, effective date. 
§13.5. Exemption for dependents. The Massachusetts personal in-
come tax statute, which grants an exemption of $600 against business 
income for each dependent of the taxpayer,! previously contained an 
extensive definition of "dependent" closely paralleling the definition 
in the federal statute.2 The Massachusetts statute was amended this 
years to provide that a $600 exemption is allowable for each dependent 
8 Acts of 1966, c. 698, §46; Acts of 1967, c. 755. 
7 Acts of 1966. c. 698. §46. 
§IM. 1 Acts of 1969. c. 546. §1, amending G.L .• c. 62. §6(c). 
§l!J.5. 1 G.L .• c. 12. §5B(4). 
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954. §§151(e). 152. 
3 Acts of 1969. c. 557. 
7
Shaw: Chapter 13: State and Local Taxation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1969
§13.8 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 347 
who qualifies for an exemption as a dependent under the federal 
statute. This change will simplify the task of the tax return preparer 
by eliminating two standards for dependent status and by making 
pertinent the not inconsiderable body of federal law of legislative, 
administrative and judicial origin relating to dependents. It is to be 
hoped that this type of adoption by reference of the federal tax statutes 
will continue in the future. 
§I8.6. Qualified retirement and death benefit trusts. The pro-
visions exempting from taxation payments made by taxpayers' em-
ployers to certain pension, annuity, disability, death benefit-sharing 
and stock bonus plan trusts have been rewritten to exempt specifically 
payments by employers which are deductible by employers under 
Section 404 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1 Similarly, the 
provisions relating to the exemption of income of such trusts have been 
rewritten to exempt specifically income of a trust qualified under 
Section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2 
§I8.7. Extension of time: Deferred payment. The authority 
granted to the commissioner to extend the time for payment of income 
taxes in the event of undue hardship and to abate a part or all of the 
interest resulting from a delayed payment has now been revoked.1 The 
commissioner retains the authority to extend for a maximum of six 
months the time of filing a return. 
§I8.8. Extension of time: Deferred filing of return. By another 
amendment,1 the validity of an extension of time granted to a corpora-
tion for filing a return is conditioned upon the corporation's paying at 
least 80 percent of the "tax shown on the return for the taxable year" 
not later than the date otherwise prescribed for the payment of the tax. 
As a consequence of the extension's becoming null and void if the 80 
percent payment test is not satisfied, the penalty provisions relating to 
late returns become applicable.2 Although the quoted language is 
ambiguous, it appears that the 80 percent test is measured against the 
tax shown on the final return and not against the tax shown on the 
tentative return filed with the application for an extension.3 The latter 
interpretation would, it is submitted, directly contradict the first two 
paragraphs of the amended section which require payment of the 
amount of tax reasonably estimated to be due with the submission of 
the application for extension and the tentative return. If the tentative 
tax is less than 80 percent of the final tax computed during the ex-
tension period, the extension is null and void under the new statute 
§13.6. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 629, §1, amending G.L., c. 62, §8(c). 
2 Acts of 1969, c. 629, §1, amending G.L., c. 62, §8(j). 
§13.7. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 554, amending G.L., c. 62, §29. 
§13.8. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 621, amending G.L., c. 63, §68B. 
2 See the discussion concerning Acts of 1969, c. 531, at §13.26 infra. 
8 See Stuetzer, Massachusetts Taxation of Corporations 12 n.28 (1969); contra, 
CCH State Tax Rep., Mass. 119976 (1969). 
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and a penalty of up to 25 percent' of the tax may be assessed Accord.-
ingly, a corporation which seeks an exteDsion when it ,has reason, to 
believe that the tax shown .on its final, return may for any reason 
differ significantly from that shown on the tentative return would be 
well advised to pay more than the tentative tax·lest it fail'to meet the 
80 percent test. ' 
C. PROPERTY TAX: COURT DECISIONS .' 
§13.9. Estimated tax payMents. During the 1969.SUllvEy year the 
Justices renaered an advisory opinionl .to the House of Representatives 
relating to the constitutionality of a: proposed amendment to Chapter 
59 'of ,the General Laws:l' whi~ would have authorized dties, towns 
and districts' adopting the amendment to req~ partial payment of 
property ~es on May 1 9.f ea~ year. The amendment provided that 
an estimated tax bill was ~o be sent out riot lat«:r than A:p'~I" 1 of ~ach 
year in an amount equal' to' o~e-fourth of the tax ass~~~d on that 
property in the prior year. Pa,yrileJits made were to be credit~to the 
true tax bill, and, in the event that th~ estimated taX' paid' exceeded 
the, tru~ tax ~ill, any interest; r.aid,~n the un~aid estiMated ~ax was to 
be credited as It prepaym~nt of taxes and any lDterest notpa14 was not 
required to be paid. ' . ' 
The Justices noted ifat th,e, est~ated tax bill took no account of 
valuation changes occurrin:g' during the preceding y~:ar arid that 
consequently the estimate4'tu would in some' eases be computed on 
the basis of more or less than full fair. cash value. This posSibility, the 
Justices. concluded; woUJ.deau~ the estimated tax 'proposal to violate 
the proportional tax requirement'of Mass.,COnst. Pt. II, (:. 1, §l, art. 4, 
and the equal relative share provision of Article 10 of the Declaration 
of Rights. The adjustnients in the eStiinat~d tax were' "entirely inad-
equate"8 to make the taxes p;wportional wh~n ultimately and validly 
assessed for the year. " ," , " , '. , 
It is unclear to what extent ~is opinion forecloses'use,~fa periodic 
payment plan~or propeny 'i~'es similar to' that now used, by die COm-
monw~alth for income tUes; ;There is ~ inti~ation,in thec;>piniori 
that'il more detailed' system ,of refunds and' credits would save the 
estimated tax paymeJit stheD;le from ','th~ constitution~l prOsC!iption 
against other than proportional taxation~" On the other hjlnd~ the cost 
of the administratiye Qlachlnery nece~ary to manage suCh a system. 
might detract fronl'the oveia:libenefit of suCh. a plan to the local taxing 
districts. A similar difficulty ~!esumably ,woulds~d ~n, the way, of 
assessments, on a' semiannual' or PlOre frequent ba$is., The inter,est of 
the local taxing districts in receipt of their revenues from property 
taxation on a quarterly o~_,aemiannual,basis is substantial; and it may 
be expected that future years will see additional attempt, by the legis-
lature to draft a statute to achieve that result '" ' 
§U.9. 1 1969 Mala. Ad •• Sh. 101'1; 249 NJt2d25. 
:I The amendment would have added anew 'led1on, 57A.' 
8 1969 Mala. Adv. Sh. at 1020, 249 N.E.2d at 24. 
" ! ,1' , 
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§I3.IO.· Exemptions: Computer memory drum. Personal property 
of a corporation other than "machinery used in the conduct of the 
business, which term ... shall not be deemed to include stock in trade 
or any personal property directly used ... in any purchasing, selling, 
accounting or· administrative function"l is exempt from the personal 
property tax. In Ultronic Systems Corp. v. Board of Assessors of Boston,2 
the property in question was a computer memory drum which received, 
stored and transmitted stock market information sent from stock ex· 
changes to the drum over telephone lines and subsequently sold to 
Ultronic's Boston subscribers through electronic devices leased by 
Ultronic to the subscribers. The Appellate Tax Board found that 
Ultronic was in' the business of leasing these devices to subscribers and 
supplying the information stored in the computer memory drum to 
them through the leased devites. 
Ultronic contended that the drum was an integral part of its stock 
in trade because without it the leased equipment (clearly part of its 
stock in trade) would be useless to the subscribers. Rather, the Court 
held, following a decisionS relating to cigarette vending machines, the 
drum was "machinery used in the conduct of the business" and not 
stock in. trade. The Court also refused to accept Ultronic's contention 
that the drum was used directly in a purcha&ing, selling, accounting 
oradm.inistrative function. The Court agreed with the Appellate Tax 
Board's finding that the drum was used in those functions only in· 
directly. 
§I3.II. Exemptions. During the 1969 SURVEY year,the Court had 
occassion to consider two cases dealing with the taxability of certain 
parcels of real estate owned by exempt organizations which were used 
for purposes allegedly incidental to, or not directly related to, the 
primary function of the exempt organization. 
In Board of Assessors o/New Braintree v. Pioneer Valley Academy, 
Inc.1 the real estate in question consisted of 18 parcels of land, each 
with a house and attached garage thereon, used as faculty residences 
by members 01 the faculty of Pioneer Valley Academy, a nonprofit 
residential college preparatory school operated by the Seventh Day 
Adventists. The residences in question were located in dose proximity 
to the boys' dormitory. Because a close relationship between the faculty 
and students was considered by the trustees of the school to be an 
integral part of the education and character-building carried on by the 
school; faculty members were required to live in these residences or 
other school housing. The faculty members wete expected to partake in 
the social and recreational activities of the students and were charged 
with supervisory duties during the evenings and on weekends. The 
Court affirmed the grant of an abatement as to the faculty residences, 
§1!1.10. 1 G.L., c. 59, §5, d. 16(2). 
2 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 20!l, 244 N.E.2d !l18. 
a Collector of Taxes of Boston v. Cigarette Service Co., 525 Mass. 162, 89 N.E.2d 
787 (1950). 
§ll1.1l. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 57!1, 246 N.E.2d 792. 
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holding that the Appellate Tax Board could reasonably find that on-
campus housing was essential to the successful implementation of the 
school's educational philosophy, and that the residences were actively 
appropriated to the immediate attainment of the school's educational 
purposes and were occupied in a manner which contributed directly 
to the accomplishment of those purposes. 
In Board of Assessors of Sharon v. Knollwood Cemeteries,2 the ex-
emption issue related to real estate owned by a cemetery, which real 
estate was not used for burial purposes in the tax years in question but 
which was intended for such in the future. Cemeteries are exempt 
from the real property tax "so long as dedicated to burial of the dead."3 
A substantial portion of the cemetery property had actually been 
developed and used for burial purposes and the entire property was 
laid out for future use. It was estimated it would take 60 years to fill 
the cemetery. Some areas were unsuitable for underground burial in 
mausoleums. The Sharon assessors sought to tax that part of the Knoll-
wood property not actually used for burial purposes or directly related 
services' during the years in question. The Court held that planning 
and substantial actual use of parts of a defined area of land for cem-
etery purposes may be found to constitute a present dedication of all 
the land for cemetery use, and that the availability of the exemption 
as to all the property is determined at the time of assessment and not 
on the basis of what may happen in the future. The Court found that 
these requirements had been satisfied with respect to all of Knollwood's 
property and accordingly affirmed the abatement granted by the 
Appellate Tax Board. 
D. PROPERTY TAX: LEGISLATION 
§13.12. Tax exempt status of charitable organizations. A new 
requirement1 has been added which a charitable organization must 
satisfy before its real and personal property can be exempted from local 
taxation. Not only must the income and profits of a charitable organi-
zation be devoted exclusively to its charitable purpose, but, upon its 
dissolution, none of its profits, income or assets may be distributed to 
any stockholder, trustee or member. 
§I3.13. Interest on delinquent property taxes. By a confusing and 
awkwardly worded piece of legislation, the interest provisions relating 
to unpaid real and property taxes have been amended.1 Under the 
existing statute,2 an 8 percent interest charge, computed as of October 
I, is assessed on taxes unpaid after November 1. In lieu of this pro-
2 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 545, 246 N.E.2d 660. 
S G.L., c. 59, §5, d. 12. 
§IS.l2. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 129, amending G.L., c. 59, §5, d. S. 
§l!I.lS. 1 Acts of 1969. c. 849, §68. 
2 G.L., c. 59, §57. 
11
Shaw: Chapter 13: State and Local Taxation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1969
§13.15 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 351 
vision, the new statute provides that if any betterment assessment, 
water rate or sewer use charge added to a real or property tax, or more 
than one-half of the property tax, remains unpaid after November 1, 
S percent interest, computed as of October 1, shall be paid on the 
unpaid amount in excess of one-half of the tax. If any portion of the 
property tax remains unpaid after May 1, in lieu of the foregoing, S 
percent interest, again computed as of the previous October 1, shall 
be paid on any betterment assessment, water rate or sewer use charge 
not paid by the previous November 1, and on the unpaid amount in 
excess of one-half of the property tax. Interest at S percent, computed 
from April 1, is charged on the balance of the unpaid tax. In essence, 
this statute will permit payment of property taxes in two installments 
without the imposition of interest, if at least one-half of the tax is paid 
prior to November 1 and the balance is paid prior to the following 
May 1. Betterment assessments, water rates and sewer changes can be 
paid as late as April ~O without the imposition of interest. This statute 
should have the effect of increasing pressure for legislation forcing 
mortgagee banks to pay interest to their mortgagors on the real estate 
tax escrow accounts, since, under the statute, banks will be able to have 
the use of one-half of the tax escrow accounts for an additional six 
months, free of interest, if they choose to defer payments to the local 
tax collectors until the end of the interest-free payment period. It 
should be noted that this statute does not become effective until July 
1, 1971. 
E. INHERITANCE TAX: LEGISLATION 
§13.14. Penalties and interest on delinquent inventories. A com-
prehensive new interest and penalty statute1 applicable to all delin-
quent returns and tax payments to the commissioner became law 
during the 1969 SURVEY year. The statute applies to "any return," and 
it is understood that the Inheritance Tax Bureau takes the position 
that the "full and complete inventory" is a return for purposes of this 
statute.2 For an estate subject to the federal estate tax, the inventory 
is not "full and complete" unless it is accompanied by the federal estate 
tax agent's closing letter.3 The inventory in any case is not "full and 
complete" unless accompanied by the newly-imposed $10 filing fee.4 
Once that filing fee has been paid, however, there will be no additional 
charges for documents such as the L-S, L-IO, and others specified in 
G.L., c. 65, §35A.1I 
§13.15. Standard deduction for debts, expenses and taxes. The 
§15.I4. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 551, discussed in greater detail at §U.26 infra. 
2 Memorandum entitled "Legislative Changes in the Calendar Year of 1969" at 1 
(Sept. 5, 1969), issued over signature of Thomas B. McDavitt, acting chief, Inher-
itance Tax Bureau. 
S Barrett and Bailey, Taxation, 4A Mass. Practice Series §llM (Supp. 1969). 
4 Acts of 1969, c. 541, §1, amending G.L., c. 65, §22. 
II Acts of 1969, c. 541, §5, amending C.L., c. 65, §55A. 
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optional (T.n.l) deductions table promulgated by the commissioner1 
as a guide to allowable debts and expenses has been giV'en legislative 
approval.2 For estates with an aggregate value of less than $100,000, a 
standard deduction for debts, expenses and taxes as set forth in a table 
to be issued· by the commissioner will be used to compute the tax, 
unless the executor, administrator or other such person elects, within 
210 days of filing his bond, to itemize deductions; Presumably, the table 
to be issued will be similar to the T.n.1 table of deductions. 
§13.16. Statute of limitations. A new statute of limitations for 
inheritance taxes has been enacted.1 Taxes must be assessed and 
collected within ten years of the decedent's death or, in the event of 
future interests, within ten years of the accrual of the right: to possession 
or enjoyment of the property; but this limitation is conditioned upon 
the commissioner's receiving notice of the death or accrual within five 
years of the event. When such notice is not given within that time, the 
statutory collection period does not expire until five years after such 
notice IS given. Filing of an inventory creates a conclusive~ presumption 
that notice has been given. It is understood that the Inheritance Tax 
Bureau takes the position that a probate inventory filed with the 
probate court is also notice to the commissioner.2 
§I3.1'1. Credit for estate tax paid. The statutory provision re-
lating to the amount of state estate tax credit allowed upon subsequent 
payment of inheritance taxes on future interests had been clarified.1 
Only that portion of the estate tax paid attributable to the particular 
future interest shall be credited against the inheritance tax. Thus, if 
a Massachusetts ,estate! tax is paid on account of future interests in two 
pieces of property, and subsequently the future inter.est in one piece of 
property ripens into possession so that an inheritance tax is than due 
with respect thereto, only that part of the estate tax attributable to 
the flltme interest ,in that property will be allowed as a credit against 
the inheritance tax due. , 
§U:r8. 'Incre~d· exemptions and tax rates. The exemptions for 
ea~ class of ,beneficiary have been increased.1 The exemption for a 
spbuseiS' now $30;000, for other class A beneficiaries it is $15,000, and 
for all other beneficiaries it is $5,000. Th~ rate of taxation has been 
raised appro~imately .5 percent for all berieficiaries,2 however, and an 
, .' , 
§l!I.15. 1 See Barrett and Bailey, Taxation, 4A Mass. Practice Series §1086 (1969). 
2 Acts of 1969,' C:!l60. 
§18.16. 1 Acts of 1969, c. !161. 
2 Memorandum entitled "Legislative Changes in the Calendar Year of 1969," at 2 
(Sept. !l. 1969). issued over signature of Thomas B. McDavitt, acting chief. Inher-
itance Tax Buteau. . ' , 
" " , §l!I.17. 1 Acts of 1969. c. 562. amending G.L.,c. 65A, §!l. 
§18.18. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 600, 12, amending G.L., c. 65, §1. 
2 Acts of 1969, c. 600, §1, amending:G.L.,c.65, §1. 
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additional 14 percent surtax has been levied.8 It is estimated that the 
loss of revenue resulting from the increased exemptions will be com-
pensated for by the increased rates of taxation.' The surtax is an addi-
tional revenue-raising measure. It should be noted that there is a clear 
error in the new statute. Section 2 thereof strikes out the second 
paragraph of Chapter 65, Section I (providing an exemption for 
a family residence owned by a husband; and. wife as joint tenants 
or tenants by the entirety) instead of the intended third paragraph 
(setting forth the existing exemptions for each class of benficiaries). 
It is understood that the commissioner has been advised of the error, 
that he will not enforce it against the clear legislative intent, and that 
corrective legislation will be sought at the earliest date. 
§18.19. Employer contributions to qualified retirement plans. By 
another new statute,1 amounts attributable to an employer's contribu-
tion to a retirement plan qualified under Sections 401 and 402 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which are paid to a deceased employee's 
beneficiaries (other than his executor) are exempt from inheritance 
taxation. Only the portion attributable to contributions to the plan by 
the deceased employee are subject to tax. 
§18.20. Exemptions. The narrow issue before the Court in Wake-
field Ready-Mixed Concrete Co. v. State Tax Commn.1 was whether 
certain replacement parts and machinery for Wakefield's concrete 
mixer trucks were "used directly . . . in an industrial plant in the 
manufacture, conversion' or processing of tangible personal property 
to be sold."2 The trucks in question in some Cases xnixed the basic 
ingredients of the concrete while in other cases the trucks 'received the 
concrete already mixed. In either case, the trucks kept the concrete 
produced in a fluid state until delivery at the destination. 
The Court, seemingly without difficulty, concluded that the process 
carried on in the trucks was manufacturing because it was an ess!ential 
part of the mixing and preservation of the consistency of the concrete 
and that the trucks themselves, either separately or viewed as a mobile 
extension of their home plant, were industrial plants 'within' the mean-
ing of the statute. Accordingly, the decisions' of the Appellate Tax 
Board denying abatements were reversed. 
The most interesting aspect of this decision is the following' state-
ment appearing after the Court concluded that Wakefield had satisfied 
the manufacturing and industrial plant tests: 
,8 Acts of 1969. c. 546. §26 . 
• 1969 H. Doc. 205, Recommendation 24. 
§ll1.l9. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 675. amending G.L., c. 65. §l. 
§l!I.20. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 775. 247 N.E.2d 869. 
2 Acts of 1966. c. 14, §1(6)(s). That statute imposed a temporary tax which was 
made permanent by Acts of 1967. c. 757, §l. and which now appears as G.L;. 
c. MH, §6(s). The precise tax in question was a use tax under c. MI, but, by §7 
thereof, the exemptions of the sales tax statute (c. MH) are applicable to the use tax. 
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... We do not regard this type of statutory provision as the type 
of e"emption concerning which a special burden rests upon a 
taxpayer, claiming the benefit of the provision, to bring himself 
within its scope .... The sub-sections are merely part of the 
statutory definition of the type of sales and uses of tangible per-
sonal property which are to be employed in measuring the exercises 
and of those which are not so to be used. We perceive no legislative 
intention that there should be any such restrictive interpretation 
of the. r statutory exemption] as that for which the (:ommission 
contends."B 
A canon for the construction of tax statutes is that exemptions and 
deductions are a matter of legislative grace and that the taxpayer must 
show himself to be clearly within the statute before he is (:ntitled to the 
exemption or deduction. This rule is stated clearly in Collector of 
Taxes of Boston v. Cigarette Service CO.,4 a case involving an exemp-
tion from personal property taxes of cigarette vending machines. State-
ments in later opinionsli questioning this rule suggest that this rule 
applies only in the case of a "true exemption,"6 liuch as the exemption 
of charitable organizations from property taxes. In one of these opin-
ions the statement in Cigarette Service was said to have been made by 
inadvertence.7 It is questionable to what extent a distinction can be 
drawn between true exelllptions and other exemptions, and it will be 
interesting to watch future tax decisions of the Court to s,ee whether 
this distinction is articulated or whether the general rule of tax statute 
construction set forth in Cigarette Service and other ca.ses is rejected 
in toto. 
§UJ.21. Applicability to. nonresident military personnel. During 
the 1969 SURVEY year, the United States Supreme Court decided a case 
which, while not i~rectly involving Massachusetts, settled an important 
issue bearing on the. application and administration of the Massachu-
setts sales and use taxes. 
In Sullivan v. United States,l the Supreme Court was (:alled upon to 
decide whether the c;onnecticut sales and use tax statutes could be 
applied, consistently with Section 514 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil 
Relief Act,2 to the purchase or use of personal property in Connecticut 
8 Wakefield Ready-Mixed Concrete Co. v. State Tax. Commn., 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 778-779, 247 N.E.2d at 871-872. 
4525 Mass. 162, 167, 89 N.E.2d 787, 790 (1950). 
Ii Assessors of Holyoke v. State Tax. Commn .• 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 155. 141-142. 
244 N.E.2d 287, 294; e.g., Boston Gas Co. v.Assessors of Boston. 5M Mass. 549, 555-
554, IlI7 N.E.2d 462. 446 (1956). 
6Id. at 555, IlI7 N.E.2d at 46.6. 
7Id. at 554. 157 N.E.2d at 466. 
§l!I.21. 1595 U.s. 169 (1969). Massachusetts joined with several other states in 
submitting a . brief amid curiae' in support of the position taken. by Connecticut 
before the Supreme Court. 
250 U.s.C. App. §574. 
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by nonresident military personnel stationed in Connecticut pursuant 
to military orders. After a detailed examination of the structure and 
language of the statute and its legislative history, the Court concluded 
that the federal act did not proscribe imposition of Connecticut's sales 
and use tax in the cases before the Court. 
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act prohibits a state from 
levying a personal property tax on personal property in the taxing 
state owned by nonresident military personnel living in the taxing 
state because of military orders. The significant finding by the Court in 
Sullivan was that the Connecticut sales tax is a tax on the privilege 
of buying or selling property and not a tax on the property itself. 
Similarly, the use tax is imposed on the privilege of using, storing or 
consuming property. The Massachusetts sales and use taxes are of 
the same nature as Connecticut's, and the Supreme Judicial Court 
would, in all probability, construe the taxes as excises on the privilege 
of transferring by sale and using personal property, not as taxes on the 
property itself. Thus, it is submitted that the Supreme Court would 
reach the same result as in Sullivan with respect to the Massachusetts 
taxes. 
F. SALES AND USE TAX: LEGISLATION 
§13.22. Boats and aircraft. Purchasers of boats and aircraft must 
now exhibit satisfactory evidence of compliance with the sales and use 
tax before a certificate of number for a motorboat can be issued or 
before a federal certificate for an aircraft can be registered.1 Similar 
provisions already apply with respect to motor vehicles.2 Under exist-
ing law, when a motor vehicle or boat is traded in to a dealer for a 
new motor vehicle or boat, the sales or use tax is applied to the 
difference between the purchase price of the new vehicle or boat and the 
trade-in allowed.3 The provision has now been extended to the trade-
in of aircraft.4 
§13.23. Intragovemmental disclosure of tax returns. The Justices 
gave an advisory opinionl to the governor relating to a dispute between 
the attorney general department and the commissioner of corporations 
and taxation concerning the disclosure by ,the latter to the. former of 
individual and corporate income tax returns for purposes of dete119in-
ing whether criminal prosecution under the income tax statutes should 
be initiated. 
The commissioner took the position that under applicable statutes 
his office must initiate criminal prosecutions for tax law violations and 
that therefore he was prevented by the antidisclosure provisions of the 
§1!1.22. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 558, §§1, 4, amending G.L., c. 64H and I, respectively. 
2 G.L., c. 64H, §26, and c. 641, §27. 
3 G.L., c. 64H, §§26-27, and c. 641, §§27-28. 
4 Acts of 1969, c. 558, §§2, 5. 
§llI.2!1. 1 1968 Mass. Adv. Sh. Hoo, 241 N.E.2d 91. 
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individual and corporate income tax statutes:l from disclosing to, any 
other agency income tax returns for the purpose of developing or 
initiating a criminal prosecution. Those statutes prevent disclosure 
except,· inter alia, for the purpose of criminal prosecutions under the 
respective chapters. 
The commissioner relied on G.L., c. 14, §S, to support his contention 
that he must initiate all criminal prosecutions under the tax laws. That 
section provides in part that the commissioner "shall be responsible 
for administering and enforcing all laws which the department is or 
shall be required to administer and enforce:' Certainly nothing in this 
language compels the conclusion that the commissioner had reached 
that his responsibility in these respects is' exclusive. 
The Justices noted that the "broad and ancient power of the attorney 
general in' criminal prosecutions'" is based not only on statutory 
authority but also in the common law. Because of the history of the 
attorney general as chief prosecuting and law ,officer of the Common-
wealth, the Justices were unwilling to construe the statutes cited by the 
commiSsioner in a manner which would subordinate the attorney 
general in the exercise of his functions to the commissioner through 
the latter's refusal to disclose income tax returns. The Justices there-
fore answered "no" to the question propounded by the governor of 
whether the commissioner was pro~bited from disclosing the tax 
returns to ~he attorney general department, but they declined to say 
whether the commissioner w~s require4 todiscl~e such returns. 
The Justices said that befo:t~ granting any request for disclosure 
from the at~orney, general, the' comptissioner cQuld require the attor-
ney general to st,ate the grounds ~or the request, including the st~tutory 
authority and the basis ~f his belief that there had been a criminal 
violation of the tax st~tut~. They further suggested that a declaratory 
Judgment would be the appropriate procedure to r~lve a dispute 
as to specific requests. 
This opinion is not a c;omplete victory for the attorney general 
in that he c~not CQn4uct' a "fiShing' expedition" into tax returns 
held by the com~$Stoner. Nevertheless, the opinion does strike a 
realistic~alance bet~een, the in~~,rests of the governmental agencies 
by allOWing the ,attoin~ gen~ral to see the returns ~n specific cases 
when he has re~I;1 ,to, believe, independent of what is contained in 
a potential defendant's tax returns, that the tax statutes have been 
criminally violated. , 
§IS.24.~ppeUate T~ ~d= Timdy application for abatement. 
In L~onard. '!!. St4,tf{J Tax ~CQP.'mn.} the commission assessed an income 
tax on Leonardi on AugUst SO, 1965, for income allegedly earned by 
Leonardi in 1951. For purpos~ of the appeal, the Court accepted as 
:I G.L •• c. 62. §S8. and c. 68, §71A reapedive1y. 
81968 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1118. 241 N.E.2d at 94. 
§18.24. 11969 Mass. Adv. SIL 595. 245 N.E.2d 753. 
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true Leonardi's assertion that in 1951 he was a full-time student with 
no income. Leonardi did not pay the assessment, but on March 8, 
1967, he filed an application for abatement together with a tax return 
for 1951 showing no tax due. The Appellate Tax Board dismissed 
Leonardi's appeal from the denial of an abatement, giving as its rea-
son the failure of Leonardi to make timely application for abatement. 
Application for an abatement may be filed by "any person who is 
required to file a return" (1) within three years from the last day for 
filing the required return, (2) within one year after the date of any 
notice of additional tax due, or (8) within one year of the date the 
return was actually filed, whichever event occurs later.2 
Leonardi argued that because his abatement application was filed 
at ,the, same time as the return he had complied with (8) above and 
that the application was therefore timely. The Court disagreed,hold-
ing that (2) was applicable. On this narrow point the Court's decision 
seems correct. Acceptance of Leonardi's contention would mean that 
a person who has filed no return would have an indefinite period to 
file an application for an abatement by virtue of this control over 
when his return is filed. The reasonable interpretation of (8) is that 
it is applicable only where there has been an assessment based on 
or following the filing of a return. 
The problem facing the Court was a statute which by its terms 
did not cover the precise situation of a person with no income during 
the year in question on whom a tax is assessed nevertheless. The three 
measuring periods for ,timeliness' of an abatement application apply 
to a person "who is required to file a return/'s and Leonardi, with 
no income, was not required to file a return.' An abatement applica-
tion by a person not otherwise required to file a return is authorized, 
but only as to overpayment of estimated taxes.11 Even (2) above is not 
literally applicable because Leonardi had paid no tax for the year 
in question, and the assessment was for the original tax, not an addi-
tional tax. :The abatement application statute should be amended 
to provide specifically for applications for abatement by a per.son not 
required to file a return against whom a tax is wrongly assessed. 
Because Leonardi had not filed his application within. one year 
after notice of additional tax due, the Court reluctantly affirmed 
dismissal of his appeal. However, the Court, by way of dictum, made 
it clear that the State Tax Commission could, on its own motion, 
set aside the assessment upon a showing by Leonardi that he received 
no income in 1951. 
§13.25. JeOpardy assessments and collections. A new jeopardy 
assessment and collection statu tel applicable to state taxes provides 
2 G~., c. 62, §45. 
S Ibid. 
4 G.L., Co 62, §22. 
II G~., Co 65, §45. 
§15.25. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 550, adding a new §55 to G.L., c. 58. 
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in essence that when the commissioner believes that collection of a 
tax will be jeopardized by delay, h~may immediately assess the tax 
with any applicable penalties and interest, whereupon the tax, in-
terest and penalties will become immediately due and payable. A 
jeopardy collection statute with respect to local taxes2 has existed 
for a long time. 
§13.26. Penalties and interest. A comprehensive new penalty 
and interest for late returns statute1 applicable to all taxes filed with 
the commission has been enacted. For late returns, a penalty.of 5 
percent of the tax for each month the return is overdue, up to a max-
imum of 25 percent of the tax, is added to and becomes a part of 
the tax. Interest at 8 percent is charged on any amount of tax not 
paid on or before the statutory due date. This act applies "notwith-
standing any other provision of law to the contrary," and the impo-
sition of these additional charges is mandatory. Existing statutes 
relating to interest and penalties2 have not been repealed, and it is 
uncertain whether those statutes will retain any vitality. 
§13.27. Collection of delinquent taxes. The first c:omprehensive 
statute giving to the commissioner power to collect unpaid taxes by 
direct levy upon property of a delinquent taxpayer was enacted during 
the 1969 SURVEY year.1 Some of the more significant provisions of the 
statute are outlined here. The power may be exercised upon the fail-
ure of the taxpayer to pay a tax within ten days after demand.2 At 
that time the commissioner may collect the tax by a levy (including 
distraint and seizure by any means)S upon all property and interests 
therein of the taxpayer (except as to specified exempt property) .• 
The commissioner may proceed immediately without regard for the 
ten-day demand period when he believes immediate collection is nec-
essary.1I Property and property rights of the taxpayer may be seized 
whether in the possession of th« taxpayer or in the possession of 
third persons, and serious penalties are imposed on third persons 
who do not surrender such property to the commissioner.8 Special 
provisions are made for a levy on insurance companies with respect 
to insurance or endowment contracts issued to the taxpayer.7 There 
are detailed provisions relating to sale of property and distribution 
2 G.L., c. 60, §19. 
§1!1.26. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 5l11, adding a new §lIIA to G.L., c. 58. See also §ll1.14, 
supra, for a specific discussion of the applicability of the statute to inheritance taxes. 
2 E.g., G.L., c. 62, §§lI7A, 41, 55 (personal income tax); G.L., c. 65, §22 (inheritance 
tax). 
§1!l.27. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 620, adding new §§!l6-lI7 to G.L., c. 58. 
2 G.L., c. 58, §!l6(a). 
SId. §36(b) . 
• Id. §!l6(a). 
II Ibid. 
8 G.L., c. 58, §lI7. 
7 Id. §lI7(b). 
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of the proceeds of sale.8 When real estate is sold, the owner of the 
property sold, or any lienholder thereon, or the owner's executor or 
administrator, may redeem the property sold within 120 days after 
the sale by paying to the purchaser the amount paid by the purchaser 
plus interest at 20 percent.9 The statute provides that the deed to 
the property purchased at the sale is prima facie evidence of the facts 
stated therein, and, if the statutory proceedings have been substan-
tially in accordance with the law, the deed conveys to the purchaser 
all right, title and interest the former owner had in the propertyl0 
and discharges all liens, titles and encumbrances junior in priority 
to the Commonwealth's lien with respect to which the levy was made.ll 
Similar provisions are made to protect the purchaser of personal prop-
erty.12 
§13.28. Appellate Tax Board: Requests for findings of fact and 
report. A significant development has occurred relating to procedure 
before the Appellate Tax Board. By a recent amendment,l under 
formal procedure, if no party requests the board to furnish findings of 
fact and a report, all parties are deemed to have waived all rights of 
appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court upon questions as to the admis-
sion or exclusion of evidence or as to the sufficiency of evidence to sup-
port a finding. In connection with this statute, it is important to note 
the following comment of the Court in an appeal from the Appellate 
Tax 13oard: "It is now more important than ever that a taxpayer 
who is interested in fully protecting his rights should use formal 
procedure and make request . . . for findings of fact and report in 
writing. Requests for rulings of law may now assume special impor-
tance."2 
8 Id. §§lI9-40, 46. 
9Id. §41(b). 
10 Id. §4l1(b). 
11 Id. §4l1(c). 
12 Id. §4!1(a). 
§l!1.28. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 692, amending G.L., c. 58A, §ll1. 
2 Ultronic Systems Corp. v. Board of Assessors of Boston, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2OlI, 
244 N.E.2d lI18. 
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